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Introduction and background     
  
While the ultimate goal of firms should be to maximize profits, there is a 
conflicting view that some managers will exhibit expense preference behavior 
under certain circumstances.  This behavior leads managers to spend money on 
items that are within their control to better their position monetarily instead of 
maximizing shareholder wealth.   
Expense preference behavior can be a significant problem in the restaurant 
industry because restaurants only average approximately a 5 percent net income 
margin.  This average was calculated based on COMPUSTAT data for all public 
restaurants in SIC code 5812 for 2000-2007.  The majority of expenses in the 
restaurant industry fall into two main categories, cost of goods sold and labor.  
Cost of goods sold expense comprises food, beverage and paper costs for fast 
food restaurants, while labor expense includes payroll and benefits.  These two 
expenses combined to average between 70 and 80 percent of sales for restaurants, 
varying depending on the type of restaurant with fast food restaurants on the 
lower end of the range.  If interest expense increases and other expenses are not 
decreased, then the net profit margin will fall below the already low margin of 5 
percent.  Due to the already low profit margin and high food and labor costs, it is 
important that managers control and decrease other expenses as interest expense 
increases. 
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Upneja, Dalbor, and Hua (2008) analyzed the effect of federal interest rate 
changes on the interest expense of publicly traded restaurant firms.  The purpose 
of this paper is to further evaluate the effect of interest rates changes on publicly 
traded restaurant firms by assessing whether or not managers adjust other 
expenses down as interest expense increases.  If they do then they are not 
exhibiting expense preference behavior.  To our knowledge, no previous study 
has been done on expense preference theory in the hospitality or restaurant 
industries.  
The organization of this paper is as follows.  The next section is a review of 
the expense preference theory literature.  Data and methodology comprise the 
third section.  This will be followed by results in section four and finishing with a 
conclusion and recommendations for further research.  
 
Literature Review 
Expense preference theory, as explained by Williamson (1963), states that 
managers of firms have a preference towards higher expenses rather than toward 
maximizing profits.  These expenses are generally those for themselves and fall 
into the categories of staff size, salaries, discretionary compensation, and 
increased plant and equipment.  There are differing views on not only whether  
managers exhibit expense preference behavior but also on whether this behavior 
is more prevalent in specific industries, market structures or firm structures over 
2
International CHRIE Conference-Refereed Track, Event 16 [2009]
https://scholarworks.umass.edu/refereed/Sessions/Friday/16
  
other firms with similar characteristics.  One of the ideas that has been analyzed is 
that highly regulated industries tend to be more expense driven than profit driven 
and that as deregulation occurs, competition increases and more competition leads 
to less expense preference behavior and more profit maximizing behavior 
(Gropper and Oswald 1996; Gropper and Hudson 2003; Mixon and Upadhyaya 
1996). 
The banking industry deregulation of the early 1980’s completely changed 
the environment for the industry.  The banking industry was highly regulated 
prior to this and with deregulation came removal of barriers to entry and increased 
competition.  Gropper and Oswald (1996) studied the banking industry before and 
after this period of deregulation and analyzed not only personnel related expenses 
but also other operating expenses such as occupancy and equipment costs.  The 
authors were not only testing whether expense preference behavior decreased as 
deregulation and competition increased, but they were also concerned with 
whether or not expense preference behavior effects other operating expenses.  
Williamson only looked at a limited number of expense types but Gropper and 
Oswald were concerned about a larger range to see if managers exhibited expense 
preference behavior in all expense categories not just personnel related.  The 
results of this study show that after deregulation expenses decreased in all tested 
categories besides furniture and equipment, which showed a slight increase. 
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Gropper and Hudson (2003) also conducted a study of savings and loan 
companies during the same period since both commercial banks and saving and 
loan companies were affected by the deregulation.  In this study the authors 
compared wages of savings and loan companies before and after deregulation and 
found that wages decreased as competition increased from deregulation.  
The financial services industry was not the only regulated industry in which 
expense preference behavior was examined. Mixon and Upadhyaya (1996) 
analyzed firms in the trucking industry to see if there was expense preference 
behavior by those managers.  Common carriers, which are highly regulated, were 
compared with less regulated contract carriers.  Results showed that contract 
carriers were more inclined to not exhibit expense preference behavior as 
compared to common carriers.  This is thought to be due to the regulation issues, 
with more regulation leading to more expense preference behavior. 
Competition differences are not only evident in regulation levels, but also in 
market structures.  Firms that operate in monopolistic or oligopolistic markets 
have no or little competition as compared to firms that operate in high 
concentration markets that have a lot of competition such as restaurants.  Rhoades 
(1980) studied how market structure affects managers spending in the banking 
industry.  The author found that managers in competitive markets were less 
inclined to exhibit expense preference behavior than those in monopolies. While 
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the study found that managers may seem to have expense preference in some 
expenses, overall expenses were lower in more competitive markets. 
Awh and Primeaux (1985) came to a slightly different conclusion in terms of 
monopolies and duopolies.  They found that in electric utility companies, 
monopoly firms actually spent less in sales and administrative expenses than did 
managers in duopoly firms.  This goes against previous studies that have found 
that highly regulated industries with low competition are more expense driven 
than profit maximizing as compared to firms with less competition in the same 
high regulation industry.  The study did show though that expense preference 
behavior can be absent in low competition, highly regulated industries.        
The level of regulation and competition is important for this study because 
most restaurants are not highly regulated and are very competitive.  The 
aforementioned studies have shown that as regulation decreases and competition 
increases, expense preference behavior by managers decreases.  This is an 
important base to have as restaurants are evaluated for expense preference 
behavior since they operate in a competitive environment.      
The organizational structure of firms has also been noted as a reason behind 
potential expense preference behavior.  Hospitals have been analyzed to see if the 
organizational structure affects managers spending behavior.  Oswald, Gardiner, 
and Jahera (1994) compared not-for-profit hospitals with proprietary hospitals for 
salaries and assets.  Their results show that proprietary hospitals spent less on 
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salaries and capital expenditures than not-for-profit hospitals did. Since 
restaurants are for-profit firms also, this study helps build support for whether or 
not restaurants can be analyzed for expense preference behavior. 
Hospitals were also evaluated in terms of another organizational structure 
that could affect expense preference behavior, management ownership (Dor, 
Duffy, and Wong, 1997).  The authors of this study tested whether hospitals that 
moved from salaried managers to contract manager were more or less inclined to 
cost minimizing amounts of labor and capital.  They found that contract managers 
exhibited less labor expense than the salaried managers they took over for due to 
the contracts stating financial improvement was a necessity for the contract to stay 
in place.  This study also showed that just because a hospital was under contract 
that did not mean that the contract managers were cost minimizers in all expenses 
all the time. 
Another potential reason for managers exhibiting expense preference 
behavior involves agency theory.  Smirlock and Marshall (1983) analyzed a 
combination of banks and savings and loans and showed that being a monopoly in 
and of itself does not lead managers to expense preference behavior but instead 
agency problems, such as imperfect information and costly monitoring costs of 
contracts, do.  Blair and Placone (1988) also found that agency costs were the 
reason for expense preference behavior.  They evaluated 2,000 saving and loans 
institutions and found that neither the amount of competition nor the structure of 
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the organization was statistically significant in whether expense preference 
behavior was exhibited by managers. Table 1 summarizes this study and the other 
studies evaluated for this paper. 
 
Table 1:  Expense preference behavior findings 
Author(s) Date Industry 
Structure 
Evaluated 
Expense preference 
findings 
Gropper and 
Oswald 1996 Banking 
Level of 
regulation 
After deregulation 
expenses decreased, 
showing that less 
regulation led to less 
expense preference 
behavior 
Gropper and 
Hudson 2003 
Savings 
and loan 
Level of 
regulation 
After deregulation 
expenses decreased, 
showing that less 
regulation led to less 
expense preference 
behavior 
Mixon and 
Upadhyaya 1996 Trucking 
Level of 
regulation 
Firms in less regulated 
markets, i.e. contract 
carriers, showed less 
expense preference 
behavior 
Rhoades 1980 Banking Amount of 
competition 
Managers in 
competitive markets 
were less likely to 
exhibit expense 
preference behavior 
than those in less 
competitive markets 
Awh and 
Primeaux 1985 
Electric 
Utility 
Amount of 
competition 
Monopoly firms spent 
less in S&A expenses 
than those in duopoly 
firms 
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Oswald, 
Gardiner, and 
Jahera 
1994 Hospitals Organizational 
structure 
Proprietary hospitals 
spent less in expenses 
than did not-for-profit 
hospitals 
Dor, Duffy, 
and Wong 1997 Hospitals 
Contract or 
salaried managers 
Hospitals that had 
contract managers had 
less labor expense 
than those with 
salaried managers 
Smirlock and 
Marshall 1983 
Banking 
and savings 
and loan 
Amount of 
competition 
Agency problems 
were the reason 
behind expense 
preference behavior 
not the level of 
competition 
Blair and 
Placone 1988 
Savings 
and loan 
Amount of 
competition and 
organizational 
structure 
Neither competition 
level nor 
organizational 
structure was 
statistically significant 
in whether managers 
exhibited expense 
preference behavior 
There are many studies that support both expense preference behavior and 
profit maximizing behavior.  There is no definitive answer though to which theory 
is correct or more predominant.  As shown with the studies above there are many 
ideas as to why expense preference behavior occurs or does not occur under 
specific conditions.  As noted in the introduction, there are no previous studies 
that analyze whether expense preference behavior occurs in restaurants.      
Whether managers exhibit expense preference behavior or not is important 
in restaurants because of the large amount of debt that restaurants have and in turn 
the large amount of interest expense.  There are a variety of studies on why 
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restaurants have high debt.  Dalbor and Upneja (2007) state that restaurants have 
higher debt because debt tends to control potential agency problems by limiting 
what managers have available to spend.  They find their sample’s mean total debt 
ratio to be more than 50 percent of assets.  Some public restaurant firms have also 
been known to borrow money to buy back outstanding stock to make more equity 
available to fewer common stockholders or to implement dividend policies, which 
also returns more equity to stockholders (Berta, 2006).  
Based on a COMPUSTAT analysis of restaurant firms from 2000 to 2007, 
interest expense averaged about two percent of sales, with some firms having 
interest expense as high as 15 percent.  These large numbers, especially in light of 
the already low profit margins, show the importance of analyzing whether 
managers of public restaurants do exhibit expense preference behavior or if they 
decrease other expenses as interest expense increases.       
 
Methodology 
Interest rates for restaurant firms are beyond managerial control, and quite often 
change with Fed fund target rates (Upneja, Dalbor & Hua, 2008).  This unique 
feature of interest rates provides an opportunity to test expense preference 
hypothesis because increasing interest rates leads to increasing restaurant interest 
expense, which would in turn leads restaurant managers to cut down other 
expenses if they truly seek to maximize profitability, where 
9
Upneja et al.: Increased Interest Expense and Management’s Expense Preference Be
Published by ScholarWorks@UMass Amherst, 2009
  
Other expenses = Revenue – Net Income – Interest Expense   (1) 
In other words, if controlling for net income as a proxy for profitability and 
other factors that could impact other expenses, profit maximization would 
indicate a negative or no relationship between interest expense and other 
expenses.  Consequently, exploring whether restaurant managers exhibit expense 
preference behaviors or not reduces to testing the following null hypothesis: 
H0:  interest expense increases have a negative or no effect on other 
expenses, ceribus peribus. 
Rejection of this hypothesis would indicate evidence of restaurant managers 
exhibiting expense preference behavior. Specifically, we have1 
iYearFranchiseFoodExpNIIntExpOtherExp εββββββ ++++++= 543210 (2) 
Where  
OtherExp = other expenses as defined in (1) 
IntExp = Interest Expense of firm i in year t. 
NI = Net Income of firm i in year t. 
FoodExp = the annual food expenditure away from home collected from the 
Bureau of Labor Statistics. 
Franchise = a dummy variable coded as one if firms disclose franchise 
practices in their firm description on Compustat or zero otherwise.  
                                                          
1
 Subscripts are suppressed for ease of presentation. 
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Year = a year index, from 1963 to 2007, to control for unobservables associated 
with time. 
ε
 is a normally distributed error term with mean 0 and standard error of 1. 
If the estimate of 1β is significantly greater than zero, then we find evidence 
that H0 is rejected. In the model we control for net income, annual food 
expenditures away from home, whether a firm utilizes franchise or not, as well as 
unobservable variables that correlate with time considering the following.  First,  
if controlling for net income as a proxy for profitability and other factors that 
could impact other expenses, profit maximization would indicate a negative or no 
relationship between interest expense and other expenses.  Moreover, food 
expenditures away from home can serve as a proxy for people’s eating behavior 
as well as restaurant demand, which could subsequently impact other expense in a 
positive fashion (Hua & Templeton, in press).  Therefore, to test the relationship 
between interest expense and other expense, profitability and the annual food 
expenditures away from home should be controlled for.  
Moreover, franchising is likely to benefit small firms by enhancing their 
growth capabilities through infusion of capital, managerial experience, and 
sharing of risks (Roh, 2002).  Claver-Cortes, Molina-Azorin, and Pereira-Molina 
(2007) suggest that franchising is highly advisable because the performance of 
chain establishments that franchise is stronger than that of the independent 
establishments.  Consequently, utilizing franchise or not could impact other 
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expenses and should be controlled for.  Furthermore, to control for factors that 
might be unobservable yet correlated with time, this study introduces a year index 
from 1992 to 2007 (Lev and Zarowin, 1999).  For example, annual changes in 
inflation and population could be factors not directly observable, yet highly 
correlated with time.  
Sample 
We sample all publicly traded restaurant firms from 1963 to 2007 and 
collect relevant financial data from COMPUSTAT and “the annual food 
expenditure away from home” from the Bureau of Labor Statistics.  After deleting 
missing values, we have a final sample consisting of 4,131 firm-year 
observations.  Our rationale for doing a long horizon test was to make sure that 
economic cycles did not cloud the relationship.  However, accounting rules and 
business environment can keep changing; therefore, we also ran the regression 
using data from 1998 to 2007.  There was no qualitative change in the results. 
  
Results 
We first examine the descriptive statistics of the sample contained in Table Two 
below. Other expense (Other Exp.) has a negative minimum because firms 
incurred losses.  This expense has a mean value of $384.69 million with a 
standard deviation of $1,307.05 million. Interest expense (Int. Exp.) has a mean of 
$10.19 million with a standard deviation of $38.49 million.  Overall, restaurant 
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firms have $17 million dollars in profits with a standard deviation of $137.18 
million.  All firm specific financial data presented exhibit wide variations, 
indicating the risky nature of restaurant business to a certain degree.  However, 
the general consumer food spending, as measured by annual food expenditures 
away from home (Food Exp.), shows a mean of $169 billion with a standard 
deviation of $106.29 billion, exhibiting much less volatility as compared to firm 
specific financial data. 
Table 2 
Descriptive statistics for the sample 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Other Expenses* 4131 384.69 1307.05 -27.35 19974.5 
Interest Expenses* 4131 10.19 38.49 0 467.6 
Net Income* 4131 16.99 137.18 -1700.83 3544.2 
Franchise 4131 0.18 0.38 0 1 
Food Expenses# 4131 169 106.29 122.47 411.04 
Revenue* 4131 411.81 1435.42 0 22786.6 
Note: 
* millions of dollars 
# billions of dollars 
Obs. = number of firm-year observations 
Other Exp. = Other Expense as defined in (1) 
Int. Exp. = Interest Expense 
NI = Net Income 
Food Exp. = the annual food expenditure away from home 
Pearson correlations are reported in Table Three.  All correlations presented 
are significant at the 1 percent level. Int. Exp. and NI are moderately correlated.  
However, this correlation does not pose any problem to our regression analysis as 
a VIF analysis indicates a value less than 2. Other Exp. and Int. Exp are highly 
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correlated, as indicated by the highest correlation of .82 in the correlation table.  
This may be considered as some support for expense preference behavior by 
managers.  
 
       Table 3 
                                   Correlation Matrix 
  
Other 
Exp. 
Int. 
Exp. NI Franchise Food Exp. 
Other 
Exp. 1         
Int. Exp. 0.821 1       
NI 0.6768 0.6107 1     
Franchise 0.0718 0.1101 0.1324 1   
Food 
Exp. 0.2249 0.1501 0.1245 0.1232 1 
 
Note: 
Other Exp. = Other Expense as defined in (1) 
Int. Exp. = Interest Expense 
NI = Net Income 
Franchise = a dummy variable coded as one if firms disclose franchise practices 
in their firm description on Compustat or zero otherwise.  
Food Exp. = the annual food expenditure away from home 
 Table four presents regression results from equation (2).  The dependent 
variable is other expenses.  The key relationship between Interest Expense (Int. 
Exp.) and Other Expense (Other Exp.) shows a coefficient estimate of 21.8699 
which is significant at all reasonable levels.  The significance of this coefficient 
indicates that H0 is rejected. In other words, on average, publicly traded restaurant 
firm managers do appear to exhibit expense preference behavior.  On the other 
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hand, it may be that managers are price takers and during periods of inflation all 
prices go up along with interest rates.  
Echoing previous research findings, utilizing franchising does help to 
increase profitability as indicated by the coefficient estimate of -158.096 between 
Franchise and Other Expense. Having a negative franchise coefficient, may 
indicate that firms with franchises are better at controlling other expenses.  White 
(1980) errors are calculated to account for potential heteroscedasticity in the data.  
Further sensitivity tests are carried out and conclusions reported in the sensitivity 
section. 
Table 4 
                                          Regression Results 
 
iYearFranchiseFoodExpNIIntExpOtherExp εββββββ ++++++= 543210
 
Other Exp. Coef. Robust Std. Err. t P>|t| 
Adjusted 
R-
Square 
Constant 61,256.74 11,620.47 5.27 0 73.70% 
Int. Exp. 21.8699 1.713 12.77 0  
NI 2.6100 0.4198 6.22 0   
Food Exp. 0.004 0.0007 6.26 0   
Franchise -158.096 26.1906 -6.04 0   
Year -31.0996 5.9002 -5.27 0   
 
 
Note: 
Other Exp. = Other Expense as defined in (1) 
Int. Exp. = Interest Expense 
NI = Net Income 
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Franchise = a dummy variable coded as one if firms disclose franchise practices 
in their firm description on Compustat or zero otherwise.  
Food Exp. = the annual food expenditure away from home 
Year = year index, 1963 to 2007, controls for unobservables associated with time. 
One surprising result is that as net income increases (falls) other expenses 
increase (fall). The relationship between food expenditures away from home and 
other expenses is significant and positive.  This may be a result of increases in 
general price levels for both food and other expenses. 
Sensitivity Tests 
 Our results are robust to alternative model structural specifications such as 
fixed effects or random effects.  In addition, for different model specifications, the 
results are robust to autocorrelation corrections.  Various size proxies such as total 
assets, sales, or market capitalization do not significantly altering the relationship 
found herein.  Moreover, the use of Selling, General and Administrative as the 
dependent variable (as opposed to our formulation of “other expenses”) does not 
qualitatively change the tested results either.  We also explored using EBITDA as 
an alternative to NI to impute “other expenses” in equation 1 and found similar 
results to those reported in the study. 
Conclusions and future research 
The purpose of this research was to examine whether or not restaurant 
managers exhibit expense preference behavior originally posited by Williamson 
(1963) in regards to interest expense.  In other words, when interest expense 
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increases, other expenses are not adjusted downward.  The major finding of this 
paper shows that other expenses increase along with interest expense.  There are a 
number of potential explanations for this.  One is that managers are indeed 
exhibiting expense preference behavior when interest expense increases.  On the 
other hand, it may be that managers are price takers and during periods of 
inflation all prices go up along with interest rates.  In conjunction with that, firms 
may borrow more money to help pay for increasing other expenses, thus raising 
interest expense.   
One potential avenue of future research could be a similar examination in 
other branches of the hospitality industry.  Another potential topic might be to 
examine any differential in which particular expenses increase, decrease or stay 
the same as interest expense increases.  This assumes the availability of very 
specific line item data from these firms.  This study could also be limited to only 
firms that showed an increase in interest expense year over year, where the 
amount of debt remained stable.  Finally, a more detailed investigation into our 
finding of the positive relationship between net income and other expenses could 
be warranted. 
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